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EMPLOYMENT AT WILL
I. INTRODUCTION

In recent years, the traditional common law rule that an employer
could terminate an employee "for good cause, for no cause or even for
cause morally wrong,", known as employment at will, has come under
attack. 2 To temper what they perceived as harsh and unjust results
from the rigid application of an anachronistic rule,3 courts and legislatures carved out a variety of exceptions to the at will employment doctrine. The decline of this venerable doctrine has not been without
side-effects; the exceptions have sacrificed the stability, predictability,
and economic efficiency the rule provides.4
1. Payne v. Western & AUt. R.R., 81 Tenn. 507, 519-20 (1884), overruled on other
grounds, Hutton v. Watters, 179 S.W. 134 (Tenn. 1915).
2. See LEx K. LARSON & PHILIP BORowsKY, UNJUST DISMISsAL § 2.07 (1991)[hereinafter UNJUST DSMISSAL]; PAUL C. WElLER, GOVERNING THE WORKPLACE: THs
FUTURE OF LABOR AND EMPLOYMENr LAw 48-104 (1990); Lawrence Blades, Employment at Will vs. Individual Freedom: On Limiting the Abusive Exercise of
Employer Power, 67 COLUM. L. REv. 1404 (1967); Peter Linzer, The Decline of
Assent. At-Will Employment as a Case Study of the Breakdown of PrivateLaw
Theory, 20 GA. L. REv. 323 (1986); Cornelius J. Peck, Unjust Dischargesfrom
Employment. A NecessaryChange in the Law, 40 OHIO ST. L.J. 1 (1979); Clyde W.
Summers, Individual ProtectionAgainst Unjust Dismissa" Time for a Statute,
62 VA. L. REV. 481 (1976); Note, ProtectingEmployees At Will Against Wrongful
Discharge: The PublicPolicyException, 96 HARV. L. REV. 1931 (1983)[hereinafter
Note, Public Policy Exception]; Note, Protecting At Will Employees Against
Wrongful Discharge: The Duty to Terminate Only in Good Faith, 93 HARV. L.
REV. 1816 (1980); J. Peter Shapiro & James F. Tune, Note, Implied Contract
Rights to Job Security, 26 STAN. L. REv. 335 (1974)[hereinafter Note, Implied ContractRights].
3. Cornelius J. Peck, PenetratingDoctrinalCamouflage: Understandingthe Development of the Law of Wrongful Discharge,66 WASH. L. REv. 719,720 (1991)[hereinafter The Law of Wrongful Discharge].
4. See, eg., RIcHARD A. EPSTEIN, FORBIDDEN GROUNDS: THE CASE AGAINST EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION LAws 147-58 (1992)[hereinafter FORBIDDEN
GROUNDS]; Richard A. Epstein, In Defense of the Contractat Will, 51 U. CHI. L.
REV. 947 (1984); Mayer G. Freed & Daniel D. Polsby, Just Causefor Termination
Rules and Economic Efficiency, 38 EMORY L.J. 1097 (1989)(commenting that Professor Cornell's proposal calling for statutes specifying forbidden grounds for discharging employees would be inefficient and curtail freedom of contract). See
also Richard A. Posner, Hegel and Employment At Wilk A Comment, 10 CAR.
DOZO L. REv. 1625 (1989).
Professor Epstein has observed that
[t]he simplest, and for some the most persuasive defense [of employment
at will] is that the terms of an employment contract are the business of
only the parties to it. Freedom of contract on this matter is no different
from freedom of speech or freedom of action. Unless and until the contract in question poses the threat of harm to third parties... or is procured by fraud or sharp practice, then each person is his or her own best
judge both of the private costs incurred by contracting and of the private
benefits obtained from that contract. Individuals have the best knowledge of their own preferences and have the strongest possible motivation
to make the best deal for themselves. A desirable contract is one in
which each party to the agreement regards himself or herself as better
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The American employment at will rule has been modified via statutory and judicial fiat.5 Congress and state legislatures have narrowed
the at will rule through a variety of statutes, most of which seek to
remedy discrimination of one form or another.6 By far, the most
widely recognized juridical limitation on the rule is the public policy
exception,7 which generally provides that an employer may not discharge an at will employee "if the purpose and intent is to frustrate
and subvert clear public policy."8 Courts have struggled to define and
determine what amounts to "clear public policy," utilizing an array of
sources and theories. In determining the public policy for a particular
jurisdiction, courts have sometimes disregarded or altered the legislature's intended remedy for a particular offense or action. Whether
such disregard amounts to a usurpation of legislative authority is the
focus of this Article.
off with the agreement than without it. Armed with that knowledge of
general theory, we do not have to concern ourselves further with the
actual operation of the contract at will to decide that it should be legally
permissible. It should be enough for judges, legislators, and commentators that the people who enter into an agreement have manifested their
consent to it, either by word or by common practice. In a world of repeated dealings with literally millions of contracts at will, the odd case of
fraud or sharp practice is of marginal institutional concern.
FORBIDDEN GROUNDS, supra at 149.
5. Although most would agree that a trend away from employment at will exists,
exactly how much the once venerable doctrine has eroded is subject to differing
opinion. At least one attempt has been made to empirically measure the decline.
The study, analyzing California case law, found the purported demise of the at
will rule to be overstated. Lewis L. Maltby, The Decline of Employment At
Will-A QuantitativeAnalysis, 41 LAB. L.J. 51 (1990).
6. E.g., National Labor Relations Act of 1935, 29 U.S.C.A. §§ 151-169 (1978)(prohibiting termination of employees due to union activity); Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967, 29 U.S.C.A. §§ 621-634 (1985)(barring age discrimination in
employment); Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 2000e to 2000e-17
(1981) (prohibiting employment discrimination on the basis of race, color, religion,
sex, or national origin); Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, 42 U.S.C.A.
§§ 12101-12117 (West Supp. 1993)(restricting employment discrimination against
the disabled); CAL. GOV'T CODE § 12940 (West 1992)(prohibiting discrimination on
the basis of marital status); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 46a-81a, -81c (1993
Supp.)(barring sexual preference employment discrimination); Act Prohibiting
Unjust Discrimination in Employment Because of Age, NEB. REV. STAT. §§ 481001 to 48-1010 (Reissue 1988)(act's ostentatious title is self-explanatory).
7. Frank J. Cavico, Employment at Will and PublicPolicy, 25 AKRON L. REv. 497,
497 (1992)("The most widely-accepted and expansive approach employed by the
courts emerges as the 'public policy' exception."); Brad Seligman, At-Will Termination: Evaluating Wrongful Discharge Actions, TRIAL, Feb. 1983, at 60, 61
("The public policy limitation on at-will terminations is the most widely accepted
of the new wrongful discharge causes of action."). See generally Note, PublicPolicy Exception, supra note 2 at 1931; Marsha Weisburst, Note, Guidelines for a
Public Policy Exception to the Employment at Will Rule: The Wrongful Discharge Tort, 13 CONN. L. REV. 617 (1981); Brian F. Berger, Note, Defining Public
Policy Torts in At-Will Dismissals,34 STAN. L. REv. 153 (1981).
8. UNJUST DISMISSAL, supra note 2, at § 1.01.
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Part II of this Article briefly examines the history and purpose behind the traditional employment at will rule and outlines the various
exceptions that have been created. Part III focuses specifically on the
public policy exception to the at will rule, examining the sources that
courts have looked to as evidence of a jurisdiction's public policy. The
interaction between the courts and legislatures in determining and implementing a jurisdiction's public policy is addressed in Part IV. Part
V proposes that a strict presumption against implying a private right
of action by way of the public policy exception exist, suggesting guidelines for courts to follow in determining whether it is consistent with
the legislative scheme to override the presumption and permit a private cause of action. Finally, Part VI concludes that greater deference
needs to be given to the legislature, the appropriate body for determining public policy in a representative democracy.
II. EMPLOYMENT AT WILL
A.

History and Background

The concept of employment at will is unique to American civil jurisprudence. 9 Originally, American courts and commentators relied
heavily on English common law precedent, holding that the relationship between an employer and employee was one of master-servant.1 0
The English rule relied on by American courts stated that an employment contract of indefinite duration, absent reasonable cause for discharge, was presumed to extend for one year. 1 '
9. For an excellent discussion of the history of employment at will, see Jay M.
Feinman, The Development of the Employment at Will Rule, 20 AM. J. LEGAL
HIST. 118 (1976). See also Janice R. Bellace, A Right ofFairDismissa" Enforcing
a Statutory Guarantee, 16 U. MICH. J.L. REF. 207, 208-09 (1983)("The United
States stands virtually alone among Western industrialized countries in failing to
provide a remedy for employees wrongfully dismissed.... [Tihe American practice of not guaranteeing workers a right of fair dismissal diverges from that of
other industrialized countries.").
Indeed, Canada and most Western European countries have enacted protections against "socially unwarranted dismissals." These protections include requirements of significant periods of notice prior to discharge (e.g., Canada,
Germany and Italy), shifting of the burden onto the employer to prove that a
discharge is for legitimate reasons (e.g., Great Britain), and mandated predismissal hearings (e.g., France). See generally Samuel Estreicher, Unjust Dismissal
Laws: Some CautionaryNotes, 33 AM. J. COMP. L. 310, 311-23 (1985); Herbert L.
Sherman, Jr., Reinstatementas a Remedy for UnfairDismissalin Common Market Countries, 29 AM. J. COMP. L. 467 (1981).
10. However, court holdings were hardly uniform. UNJUST DISMISSAL, supra note 2,

at § 2.03.
11. Blackstone articulated the English rule as:
If the hiring be general, without any particular time limited, the law construes it to be a hiring for a year; upon a principle of natural equity, that
the servant shall serve, and the master maintain him, throughout all the
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By the late nineteenth century, the English rule was displaced and
the concept of employment at will was born. The genesis of the socalled American rule can be traced to Horace Gay Wood's treatise on
the law of master and servant.1 2 According to Wood, an employment
contract was presumed to be terminable at will unless its duration had
been specified by the parties. Although Wood's formulation of the
rule lacked authority and was an apparent departure from prior case
law, 13 at will employment was welcomed by American courts for its
laissez-faire, free-market approach to employment contractual
relationships.14
Recently, however, courts have found that an inflexible application
of the at will rule sometimes causes harsh results. The employment at
will rule has suffered a barrage of criticism, as scholars have questioned the continued validity and viability of the rule in the modern
workplace. To remedy this perceived injustice, courts and legislatures
began devising creative exceptions to the rule.
B.

Chipping Away at Employment at Will
As commentators began to question the merits of employment at

will,15 courts discovered means of circumventing the doctrine through

the use of common law theories.6 Although a number of different
revolutions of the respective seasons, as well when there is work to be
done as when there is not.
WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 425 (21st ed.

1847).
12. HORACE G. WOOD, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF MASTER AND SERVANT (1877).

Wood wrote that:
With us the rule is inflexible, that a general or indefinite hiring is prima
facie a hiring at will, and if the servant seeks to make it out a yearly
hiring, the burden is upon him to establish it by proof.... [I]t
is an indefinite hiring and is determinable at the will of either party, and in this
respect there is no distinction between domestic and other servants.
Id., at § 134, at 272.
13. Alfred W. Blumrosen, Employer Discipline: U.S. Report, 18 RUTGERS L. REV.
428, 432-33 (1964); Note, Implied ContractRights, supra note 2, at 340-47. But see
Mayer G. Freed & Daniel D. Polsby, The Doubtful Provenanceof "Wood's Rule"
Revisited, 22 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 551 (1990)(arguing that Wood's formulation was not a
departure from common law).
14. See Daniel A. Mathews, Comment, A Common Law Action For the Abusively
DischargedEmployee, 26 HASTINGS L.J. 1435, 1438-41 (1975); Note, Implied Contract Rights, supra note 2, at 342-43. Cf.Ludwick v. This Minute of Carolina, Inc.,
337 S.E.2d 213, 214 (S.C. 1985)("[T]he doctrine, if not expressly created to subserve the laissez-faire climate of the late 19th century, has had the effect of doing
SO.").

15. Probably the first article to seriously question the validity of employment at will
was Blades, supra note 2.
16. It is disputed when exactly the first case to modify the at will rule came down.
Some, including Professor Larson, believe that Kouff v. Bethlehem-Alameda
Shipyard, Inc., 202 P.2d 1059 (Cal. Ct. App. 1949), was the first to signal that
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exceptions to the traditional rule have evolved, 17 these exceptions can
18
generally be categorized as sounding in either contract or tort.
1.

Contract Theories

Contract-based exceptions to employment at will have generally
arisen in two contexts: (1) where courts are willing to infer obligations
against an employer arising from employer representations or conduct; and (2) where courts imply in law a specific duty of good faith
and fair dealing in the performance and enforcement of the employment contract.
a. Implied-in-Fact
A number of courts have evaded the restrictions of the at will rule
by implying a contractual term that prevents an employer from discharging an employee except for good cause, based upon the acts and
conduct of the parties, and interpreted in light of the surrounding circumstances. This theory rests on the traditional underpinnings of
contract jurisprudence.
Although once uniformly rejected,19 a number of jurisdictions have
embraced the doctrine of promissory estoppel in the context of employment cases.2 0 Generally, promissory estoppel is invoked in situa-

17.

18.

19.
20.

courts may be open to reevaluating the merits of employment at will. In Kouff,
the court enforced a state statute that prohibited the discharge of employees who
served as election officers. The court rejected the employer's argument that this
express statutory prohibition should not affect his right to terminate at will.
In addition to challenging their actual termination, discharged employees may
also seek damages for the manner in which the discharge was carried out. A
number of theories exist, including: (1) intentional infliction of emotional distress; (2) fraud; (3) tortious interference with contractual relations; (4) defamation; (5) negligence; (6) invasion of privacy; and (7) false imprisonment.
The difference whether a discharged employee proceeds under a contract or tort
theory is extremely important due to the remedies available under each theory.
The early cases which recognized a public policy exception almost invariably
were grounded in contract. This historical note is believed to have occurred because plaintiff's attorneys, aware that they were charting new ground, considered
the contract theory to be less radical. Thus, they would be pressing their luck to
assert an action grounded in tort. UNJUST DIsMIsSAL, supra note 2, at § 3.02 n.7.
See, e.g., Walker v. Modern Realty of Missouri, Inc., 675 F.2d 1002 (8th Cir. 1982);
Bates v. Jim Walter Resources, Inc., 418 So. 2d 903 (Ala. 1982).
The case most often cited for the proposition of promissory estoppel in the employment setting is Grouse v. Group Health Plan, Inc., 306 N.W.2d 114 (Minn.
1981). In Grouse,the plaintiff was offered employment as a pharmacist by Group
Health. Grouse then gave two weeks notice to his current employer. During that
period, Grouse also turned down other employment offers. However, when
Grouse called in to find out when he should report for work, he was told that
someone else had been 'hired. The court, citing section 90 of the Restatement of
Contracts (1932), held that "it would be unjust not to hold Group Health to its
promise." Id at 116. See also Bower v. AT&T Technologies, Inc., 852 F.2d 361 (8th
Cir. 1988) (court allowed plaintiff to recover damages sustained in reasonable det-
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tions where employees have detrimentally relied upon promises of
initial employment and job security made by the employer. 2 ' In job
security cases, courts are more likely to find implied contracts when
the plaintiff is a professional or management level, tenured
2
employee.2
Courts have also looked to collateral sources such as employee
handbooks and oral representations to find implied contractual obligations. Declarations made in personnel materials, such as employment
applications and interoffice memoranda, have been held to bind
the employer to promises regarding job security or discharge
3
procedures.2
b.

Good Faith and FairDealing

Several courts have departed from the at will rule by holding that a
duty of good faith and fair dealing is implied in employment contracts.24 This exception to the traditional rule mandates that neither
party to the employment agreement will do anything that will impair

21.
22.

23.

24.

rimental reliance on promise of future employment); Morishige v. Spencecliff
Corp., 720 F. Supp. 829 (D. Haw. 1989)(employee allowed to recover under promissory estoppel theory); Presto v. Sequoia Sys., Inc., 633 F. Supp. 1117 (D. Mass.
1986)(employer's false representations were sufficient to invoke doctrine of
promissory estoppel); Glover v. Sager, 667 P.2d 1198 (Alaska 1983)(court held employees established prima facie case of promissory estoppel); Mers v. Dispatch
Printing Co., 483 N.E.2d 150 (Ohio 1985), appeal after remand, 529 N.E.2d 958
(Ohio 1989)(under certain circumstances, the doctrine of promissory estoppel is
applicable and binding to oral employment at will agreements).
See Kelvin C. Berens & Joseph Dreesen, Is Employment-At-Will Alive and Well
in Nebraska? Yes, but.. ., 21 CREIGHTON L. REv. 533, 535-36 (1988).
See Afight over the freedom to fire, Bus. WK., Sept. 20, 1982, at 116 (professional
and management level employees gain most from expansion of implied contract
doctrine).
See, e.g., Bernstein v. Aetna Life & Casualty, 843 F.2d 359 (9th Cir. 1988); Tonssaint v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield of Michigan, 292 N.W.2d 880 (Mich. 1980); Renner v. Wurdeman, 231 Neb. 8, 434 N.W.2d 536 (1989); Hebard v. AT&T Co., 228
Neb. 15, 421 N.W.2d 10 (1988); Morris v. Lutheran Medical Center, 215 Neb. 677,
340 N.W.2d 388 (1983); Woolley v. Hoffmann-LaRoche, Inc., 491 A.2d 1257, modified, 499 A.2d 515 (N.J. 1985); Kestenbaum v. Pennzoil Co., 766 P.2d 280 (N.M.
1988); Seibel v. Liberty Homes Inc., 752 P.2d 291 (Or. 1988); Larson v. Kreiser's
Inc., 427 N.W.2d 833 (S.D. 1988).
See, e.g., Fortune v. National Cash Register Co., 364 N.E.2d 1251 (Mass. 1977);
Monge v. Beebe Rubber Co., 316 A.2d 549 (N.H. 1974).
Ironically, the exception for breaching the covenant of good faith and fair
dealing suffers from the same problem as the public policy exception in that it is
not easily defined. See Robert S. Summers, "Good Faith" in General Contract
Law and the Sales Provisions of the Uniform Cbmmercial Code, 54 VA. L. REV.
195, 262-63 (1968)(Good faith "functions to rule out many different forms of bad
faith... [and] any general definition of good faith, if not vacuous, is sure to be
unduly restrictive, especially if cast in statutory form.").
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the right of the other to receive the benefits of the agreement. 25
For example, in the oft-cited Pugh v. See's Candies, Inc.,26 the
court held that an employee who was abruptly terminated after thirtytwo years of service with the employer could maintain an action for
breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing. The
court noted the longevity of the plaintiff's service and an implied
promise by the employer to refrain from acting arbitrarily in dealing
with its employees as the basis for the covenant.27
Some courts have found authority for this exception in the Uni29
form Commercial Code28 and the Restatement (Second) of Contracts.
However, perhaps due to the potential breadth of the exception, a
number of jurisdictions still refuse to judicially impose a duty of good
faith and fair dealing in the employment context.30
2. Tort Theories
Tort-based attempts to abrogate employment at will are often preferred over contract theories by discharged employees, primarily because of the greater potential for large damage awards under tort
law.3' The most widely accepted tort-based limitation on the at will
rule is the public policy exception. 32 This limitation focuses on the
concept that basic public policy overrides the freedom of contract embodied in the traditional at will rule. The public policy exception, the
focus of this Article, is explored in greater detail in Part III.
25. Comunale v. Traders & Gen. Ins. Co., 328 P.2d 198 (Cal. 1958), quoted in Cleary v.
American Airlines, Inc., 168 Cal. Rptr. 722 (Cal. Ct. App. 1980).
26. 171 Cal. Rptr. 917 (Cal. Ct. App. 1981). Pugh is best known as an implied contract
case rather than for its discussion on the covenant of good faith and fair dealing.
27. Id. at 926-27.
28. U.C.C. § 1-203 (1990).
29. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 205 (1981).
30. See, e.g., Renner v. Wurdeman, 231 Neb. 8, 434 N.W.2d 536 (1989); Stratton v.
Chevrolet Motor Div., 229 Neb. 771, 428 N.W.2d 910 (1988); Jeffers v. Bishop
Clarkson Memorial Hosp., 222 Neb. 829, 387 N.W.2d 692 (1986); Parnar v. Americana Hotels, Inc., 652 P.2d 625 (Haw. 1982); Brockmeyer v. Dun & Bradstreet, 335
N.W.2d 834 (Wis. 1983).
31. UNJUST DISmtssAL, supranote 2, at § 3.02. This, of course, includes punitive damages where available. See, e.g., Swanson v. Eagle Crest Partners, 805 P.2d 727 (Or.
Ct. App. 1991); Roberts v. Ford Aerospace & Communications Corp., 274 Cal.
Rptr. 139 (Cal. Ct. App. 1990).
32. See supra note 7 and accompanying text. However, several states have bucked
the trend, refusing to recognize a public policy exception. Hinrichs v. Tranquilaire Hosp., 352 So. 2d 1130 (Ala. 1977); DeMarco v. Publix Super Markets, Inc.,
384 So. 2d 1253 (Fla. 1980); Troy v. Interfinancial, Inc., 320 S.E.2d 872 (Ga. Ct.
App. 1984); Kelly v. Mississippi Valley Gas Co., 397 So. 2d 874 (Miss. 1981); Murphy v. American Home Prods., Corp., 448 N.E.2d 86 (N.Y. 1983).
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III. THE PUBLIC POLICY EXCEPTION TO THE AT WILL

RULE
A.

Generally

The cause of action for wrongful or retaliatory discharge in violation of public policy gained prominence in the seminal case
Petermannv. InternationalBrotherhoodof Teamsters.3 3 Therein, the
plaintiff was employed by the defendant labor union on an at will basis. The plaintiff alleged that he was ordered by his employer to perjure himself when he was subpoenaed to testify at a hearing before a
committee of the state legislature. When the plaintiff refused to
"make certain false and untrue statements in the testimony,"3 4 as the
plaintiff alleged, he was terminated.
The California appellate court held that the plaintiff had a right to
damages for unlawful termination contrary to the state's public policy.
As the court explained,
It would be obnoxious to the interests of the state and contrary to public policy and sound morality to allow an employer to discharge any employee,
whether the employment be for a designated or unspecified duration, on the
ground that the employee declined to commit perjury, an act specifically en35
joined by statute.

The California court reasoned that, although the statute it relied
upon provided for a criminal penalty, it was necessary to use the criminal statute in a civil manner to best effectuate what the court perceived as "the state's declared public policy against perjury."36
Cases holding that a particular discharge violated public policy can
generally be grouped into three classic patterns of public interest. 37
(1) Refusal to Commit an Unlawful Act
In this group of cases the employee has been terminated for her
refusal to perform an act which she reasonably believes is unlawful.
The archetypal example cited for this category is Petermann,38 where
an employee was terminated for his refusal to give perjured testimony
33. 344 P.2d 25 (Cal. Ct. App. 1959).
Because the at will rule was so firmly entrenched, most commentators recognized Petermannas a mere anomaly rather than the dawning of the trend in the
modification of the American employment at will doctrine. The Law of Wrongful
Discharge,supra note 3, at 723, 724 n.24.
34. Petermann v. International Brotherhood of Teamsters, 344 P.2d 25, 26 (Cal. Ct.
App. 1959).
35. I& at 27.
36. Id
37. Note, PublicPolicy Exception, supra note 2, at 1937. Another theory of categorizing public policy exception cases has evolved which distinguishes between internal and external public policy, thus centering on the third-party effects of the
discharge. HENRY H. PERRIT, JR., EMPLOYEE DISMISSAL LAW AND PRACTICE

§§ 5.8-.18 (2d. ed. 1987).
38. See supra notes 33-36 and accompanying text.
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at a trial or administrative hearing. 39 Others cases in this category
have included termination for refusing to violate federal and state antitrust laws,40 the firing of an employee who refused to pump leaded
gas into an automobile believing it to be a violation of the federal
Clean Air Act4l and refusing to violate a state antiprostitution
statute.42
(2) Fulfilling a Public Obligation
A passel of courts have recognized a cause of action for employees
terminated for performing an important public obligation. These
courts have recognized that an overriding public interest exists in permitting employees to fulfill their duties as citizens. Jury duty,43 re4
44
fusal to violate a professional code of ethics and whistle blowing 5
39. See also Merkel v. Scovill, Inc., 570 F. Supp. 133 (S.D. Ohio 1983)(court recognized
a cause of action for an employee who was discharged because he refused to commit perjury at his employer's request). But see Ivy v. Army Times Publishing Co.,
428 A.2d 831 (D.C. Ct. App. 1981).
40. See, e.g., McNulty v. Borden, Inc., 474 F. Supp. 1111 (E.D. Pa. 1979); Tameny v.
Atlantic Richfield Co., 610 P.2d 1330 (Cal. 1980). Plaintiffs proceeding under antitrust laws are presented with difficult and complex standing issues. See Ostrofe v.
H.S. Crocker Co., 670 F.2d 1378 (9th Cir. 1982), vacated and remanded, 460 U.S.
1007 (1983), on remand, 740 F.2d 739 (9th Cir. 1984).
41. Phipps v. Clark Oil & Refining Corp., 396 N.W.2d 588 (Minn. Ct. App. 1986), qffd,
408 N.W.2d 569 (Minn. 1987).
42. Lucas v. Brown & Root, Inc., 736 F.2d 1202 (8th Cir. 1984)(applying Arkansas
antiprostitution law to find that an employee was wrongfully discharged for refusing the sexual advances of her foreman).
For other examples in which courts have recognized the public policy exception where an employee is discharged for refusing to commit an unlawful act, see
Sheets v. Teddy's Frosted Foods, Inc., 427 A.2d 385 (Conn. 1980)(insisting that
employer comply with federal food and drug laws); Trombetta v. Detroit, T. &
I.R.R, 265 N.W.2d 385 (Mich. Ct. App. 1978)(refusing to alter state mandated pollution reports); O'Sullivan v. Mallon, 390 A.2d 149 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div.
1978)(refusing to perform catherizations for which employee was not properly
licensed); Harless v. First Nat'l Bank, 246 S.E.2d 270 (W.Va. 1978)(refusing to violate a consumer credit protection law).
43. See, eg., Wiskotoni v. Michigan Nat'l Bank-West, 716 F.2d 378 (6th Cir. 1983);
Nees v. Hocks, 536 P.2d 512 (Or. 1975); Reuther v. Fowler & Williams, Inc., 386
A.2d 119 (Pa. 1978); Hodges v. S.C. Toof & Co., 833 S.W.2d 896 (Tenn. 1992). But
see Bender Ship Repair, Inc. v. Stevens, 379 So. 2d 594 (Ala. 1980).
Some courts have merely drawn upon state contempt laws to remedy situations where an employer terminates an employee for being absent for jury duty.
See, e.g., People v. Vitucci, 199 N.E.2d 78 (Ill. Ct. App. 1964).
44. See, e.g., Kalman v. Grand Union Co., 443 A.2d 728 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div.
1982); Pierce v. Ortho Pharmaceutical Corp., 417 A.2d 505 (N.J. 1980).
As one commentator opined:
There are several reasons to carve an exception to the at-will doctrine
for professionals based on the codes of ethics ....
[E]ach profession is
based on distinctive knowledge and service to the community. Each
helps shape our culture in significant ways. Law, medicine, and other
professions play a direct role in the formation of public policy and its
implementation. The practitioners in these highly trained professions
possess specific skills needed to solve individual and communal
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have all served as the basis for wrongful discharge claims in this category of public policy cases.
(3) Exercising a Right or Privilege
Another category encompasses those cases where an employee is
terminated for exercising a legal right or privilege. Courts have protected such employees under the belief that the threat of discharge
would have a chilling effect on the exercise of the specific right or
privilege. Typical cases have involved the wrongful termination of
employees for filing workers' compensation claims46 and occupational
safety and health complaints.47
B.

Sources of Public Policy
Over the years, courts have struggled to place an exact definition
problems. They must be given the leeway to address these problems in a
manner consistent with ethical standards. In addition, the at-will professional employee motivated by ethical concerns attempts to correct a
problem at the risk of the substantial financial investment in his education, his long-term financial security, and his career standing and reputation. Even if fortunate enough to avoid dismissal (occupational capital
punishment for the worker), the professional employee may encounter
more subtle retaliatory actions, such as less desirable work assignments,
loss of prestige, and decrease in promotional and pay opportunities.
Moreover, state licensure exerts tremendous pressure upon the atwill professional employee. The statutes grant regulatory bodies the
power of admission and expulsion from the profession. A professional
license may be revoked because of the violation of statutes that allow
discipline because of "unprofessional" or "unethical" conduct. The disciplinary statutes are based on violations of codes of ethics and statepromulgated rules and regulations.
Seymour Moskowitz, Employment-At-Will and Codes of Ethics: The Professional's Dilemma, 23 VAL. U. L. REv. 33, 59-60 (1988)(footnote omitted).
45. See, e.g., Wagner v. City of Globe, 722 P.2d 250 (Ariz. 1986); Sheets v. Teddy's
Frosted Foods, Inc., 427 A.2d 385 (Conn. 1980); Geary v. United States Steel Corp.,
319 A.2d 174 (Pa. 1974). See generally Venessa F. Kuhlmann-Macro, Comment,
Blowing the Whistle on the Employment At-Will Doctrine,41 DRAKE L. REV. 339
(1992).
46. See, e.g., Kelsay v. Motorola, Inc., 384 N.E.2d 353 (Ill. 1978); Frampton v. Central
Indiana Gas Co., 297 N.E.2d 425 (Ind. 1973); Springer v. Weeks & Leo Co., 429
N.W.2d 558 (Iowa 1988); Murphy v. City of Topeka-Shawnee County Dep't of Labor Servs., 630 P.2d 186 (Kan. Ct. App. 1981); Firestone Textile Co. Div. v. Meadows, 666 S.W.2d 730 (Ky. 1983); Sventko v. Kroger Co., 245 N.W.2d 151 (Mich. Ct.
App. 1976); Hansen v. Harrah's, 675 P.2d 394 (Nev. 1984); Krein v. Marian Manor
Nursing Home, 415 N.W.2d 793 (N.D. 1987); Brown v. Transcon Lines, 588 P.2d
1087 (Or. 1978); Niesent v. Homestake Mining Co. of California, 505 N.W.2d 781,
(S.D. 1993). See generally ZA ARTHUR LARSON, THE LAW OF WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION § 68.36 (1993). Cf. Smith v. Gould, Inc., 918 F.2d 1361 (8th Cir.
1990)(applying Nebraska law).
47. See, e.g., Hentzel v. Singer Co., 188 Cal. Rptr. 159 (Cal. Ct. App. 1982). The federal
Occupational Safety and Health Act, however, does not create a private right of
action for retaliatory discharge. Taylor v. Brighton Corp., 616 F.2d 256 (6th Cir.
1980).
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on the term "public policy."48 The vague and amorphous nature of the
term is renowned, 49 making it "perhaps the most expansive and
widely comprehensive phrase known to the law."50 Determining what
is to be regarded as public policy is undoubtedly the Achilles heel of
the public policy exception. 51
While the inherent nature of the term prohibits precise definition,
public policy includes general notions of goodness, justness and abstention from activity which is injurious to the public good.5 2 However, such sweeping language gives little comfort to courts attempting
to forward a clearly articulated public policy.
To narrow the potential expansiveness of the public policy exception, courts have limited the sources from which the public mandate
may be derived. Some courts have recognized the public policy exception only where substantial and definite indications of public policy
are present.53 Such courts generally look only to a jurisdiction's positive law as evidence of public policy. The specificity and clarity required by courts creates a continuum of sources from which public
policy may be found, ranging from clear articulations of positive law
found in constitutions and statutes, through the more nebulous bases
54
such as those deemed to be public policy by judicial fiat.
A universally agreed upon source of public policy is state and federal constitutional provisions. Constitutions are considered funda48. Many have compared it to attempts to place a precise definition on fraud. See,
e.g., WII.AMI W. STORY, STORY ON CONTRACTS § 546 (1847)("It has never been
defined by the courts, but has been left loose and free of definition, in the same
manner as fraud."); Maryland Casualty Co. v. Fidelity & Casualty Co., 236 P. 210,
212 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1925)("The question, what is public policy in a given case,
is as broad as the question of what is fraud.");
49. Noble v. City of Palo Alto, 264 P. 529 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1928).
50. Susan K. Datesman, Sides v. Duke Hospital: A Public Policy Exception to the
Employmentt-at Will Rule, 64 N.C. L. REV. 840, 844 n.48 (1986)(quoting 72 C.J.S.
Policy § 209 (1951)).
The nebulous nature of public policy is evidenced by the definition announced
by Lord Truro: 'By public policy is intended that principle of the law which
holds that no subject can lawfully do that which has a tendency to be injurious to
the public, or is against the public good." Egerton v. Lord Brownlow, 10 Eng. Rep.
359, 437 (1853).
51. Palmateer v. International Harvester Co., 421 N.E.2d 876, 878 (Ill. 1981). The
Palmateercourt noted that "[tihere is no precise definition of the term. In general, it can be said that public policy concerns what is right and just and what
affects the citizens of the State collectively." I
52. Safeway Stores v. Retail Clerks Int'l Ass'n, 261 P.2d 721, 726 (Cal. 1953).
53. Wesburst, supranote 7, at 622; Brockmeyer v. Dun & Bradstreet, 335 N.W.2d 834,
840 (Wis. 1983)("The public policy must be evidenced by a constitutional or statutory provision.").
54. In Palmateer,the court set forth the following hierarchy: "[Public policy] is to be
found in the State's constitution and statutes, and, when they are silent, in its
judicial decisions." Palmateer v. International Harvester Co., 421 N.E.2d 876, 878
(Ill. 1981).
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mental expressions of the policy of a jurisdiction. Moreover,
constitutional amendments have been regarded as expressions of public policy.55
Expressions of public policy have consistently been derived from
statutory provisions. Both state and federal statutes serve as legitimate articulations of a jurisdiction's public policy, although some
states reject the use of federal law as a manifestation of the public
policy for a particular jurisdiction.56 Whether or not courts, in interpreting statutory provisions, adhere to the explicit and implicit intent
of the legislature is another issue.5 7
A minority of courts have found licensing regulations, administrative guidelines and municipal ordinances to be valid indicators of a jurisdiction's public policy.5 8 In so doing, such courts have focused less
on whether the regulations bear a legislative imprimatur than on how
strongly those regulations protect or benefit the citizenry. 59
In cases such as Palmateerv. InternationalHarvesterCo.,60 courts

have relied upon public policy rooted in general public standards and
morals, without requiring plaintiffs to point to a specific source of positive law. The employee in Palmateeralleged that he was discharged
for supplying information to a local law enforcement agency regarding
his suspicion that a coworker had violated criminal laws, and for
agreeing to gather further evidence and testify against the coworker if
so requested. The Illinois Supreme Court reversed the dismissal of
the plaintiff's wrongful discharge claim, holding that the plaintiff
could maintain a valid cause of action by alleging that the discharge
contravened public policy.61 The court stated that "[n]o specific constitutional or statutory provision requires a citizen to take an active
part in the ferreting out and prosecution of crime, but public policy
62
nevertheless favors citizen crime-fighters."
55. Brockmeyer v. Dun & Bradstreet, 335 N.W.2d 834, 840 (Wis. 1983).
56. For courts which have rejected the use of federal law as evidence of state public
policy, see Guy v. Travenol Labs, Inc., 812 F.2d 911 (4th Cir. 1987); Rachford v.
Evergreen Int'l Airlines, Inc., 596 F. Supp. 384 (N.D. Ill. 1984); Pratt v. Caterpillar
Tractor Co., 500 N.E.2d 1001 (Ill. Ct. App. 1986).
57. See infra Part IV.
58. See, e.g., Eisenberg v. Insurance Co. of N. Am., 815 F.2d 1285 (9th Cir. 1987)(state
insurance guideline); Kalman v. Grand Union Co., 443 A.2d 728 (N.J. Super. Ct.
App. Div. 1982)(state pharmacy regulations and code of ethics).
Generally, municipal ordinances have been held to not provide a clear enough
mandate of public policy to permit a cause of action for wrongful discharge. Gould
v. Campbell's Ambulance Serv., 474 N.E.2d 740 (Ill. App. Ct. 1984), rev'd, 488
N.E.2d 993 (Ill. 1986). But see Hobson v. McLean Hosp. Corp., 522 N.E.2d 975
(Mass. 1988).
59. UNJUST DISMISsAL, supra note 2, at § 6.03[2].
60. 421 N.E.2d 876 (Ill. 1981).
61. I& at 879.
62. Id at 880.
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Ironically, it is in the cases involving the clearest articulations of
public policy where courts appear to be the most willing to imply a
private right of action via the public policy exception to employment
at will. Courts that look to positive law sources of public policy such
as constitutional or statutory provisions are more inclined to infer a
private right of action, even where the positive law is completely silent
as to the preferred means of enforcement, or where a private right of
action is implicitly prohibited. However, courts have sought to give at
least an aura of deference to the legislature in public policy matters by
requiring discharged employees to point to some specific source of
clearly mandated public policy, whatever that source may be.
Whether courts actually defer or not is where the debate lies.
IV.

THE INTERACTION BETWEEN THE JUDICIARY AND
LEGISLATURE-WHO WINS THE TUG OF WAR?

In deciding whether a sufficiently lucid mandate of public policy
exists to justify abrogating the at will rule, courts have examined how
firmly entrenched and universally agreed upon the particular policy
is. 63 Where the public policy is clear, the legislature and judiciary can
march in lock step when implementing that particular policy. However, in those cases where the public policy is not clear, courts must
tread cautiously to avoid usurping the legislative prerogative in that
particular sphere of policy. The interrelationship between the judiciary and legislature in dealing with the public policy exception to employment at will can generally be grouped into three categories.
A.

Conflict

A number of cases have arisen where courts have relied on their
own interpretation of the legislature's intent. However, in all actuality, the courts may have ignored the implicit intent of the legislature
under the guise of deference. The quintessential example is where a
statute prohibits the discharge of an employee for specified reasons
but does not declare a private remedy. Legislative silence may indicate an intent not to provide for a private cause of action for wrongful
discharge.64 In such cases, courts struggle with the issue of whether a
private right of action may be implied in the prohibition.
Other examples where a court may have ignored the remedies
adopted by the legislature exist. In Ambroz v. Cornhusker Square
63. Weisburst, supra note 7, at 622.
64. See, e.g., Kelsay v. Motorola, Inc., 384 N.E.2d 353 (1978). The Illinois Supreme
Court held that the subsequent adoption of a criminal retaliation remedy in the
state workers' compensation provision did not imply the absence of a civil remedy, since the criminal sanction did not alleviate the plight of the discharged
employee.
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Ltd.,65 the plaintiff was employed as a security guard by the defendant. The plaintiff alleged that he was ordered to take a truth and deception (polygraph) examination by the end of the work day, or he
would be terminated. 66 Upon his refusal, the plaintiff was terminated.
Subsequently, the plaintiff brought a wrongful discharge action,
claiming that he was entitled to forego any polygraph examination
under the Nebraska Licensing of Truth and Deception Examiners
Act.67 The act states, in pertinent part:
No employer or prospective employer may require as a condition of employment or as a condition for continued employment that a person submit to a
truth and deception examination unless such employment involves public law
8
enforcement.

6

The remedy expressly provided by the state legislature was a misdemeanor violation of the state criminal code. 69
In holding that the plaintiff could recover damages for wrongful
discharge, the Nebraska Supreme Court held that the statute was "a
pronouncement of public policy on the issue of wrongful discharge." 70
The supreme court found it inconsequential that the statute did not
provide a private remedy for those wrongfully discharged in contravention of the act. 7 ' After examining the legislative history of the act,
the court determined that the legislature was, in effect, promulgating
public policy which clearly and unambiguously prohibited an employer's use of a polygraph to deny employment.72
Arguably, the Ambroz court ignored the implicit determination
made by the Nebraska legislature in how the Truth and Deception
Examiners Act was to be enforced. The legislative history clearly
evinced that the only expressed remedy provided by the legislature
under the act was a criminal sanction. Implicit in the legislature's
wording of the statute was its rejection of a private cause of action by
employees to enforce the act. Thus, the legislature had considered
how it wanted the statute to be enforced, and chose not to provide for
a private right of action. If this line of reasoning is correct, the court
usurped the legislature's prerogative by permitting a private cause of
action for violation of the Truth and Deception Examiners Act.
A similar case of legislative-judicial conflict arose in Framptonv.
65. 226 Neb. 899, 416 N.W.2d 510 (1987).
66. Id. at 900, 416 N.W.2d at 512.
67. NEB. REV. STAT. § 81-1901 to -1936 (Reissue 1981).

68. Id § 81-1932 (Reissue 1981). It was stipulated that the plaintiff, a security guard,
was not involved in public law enforcement. Ambroz v. Cornhusker Square Ltd.,
226 Neb. 899, 899, 416 N.W.2d 510, 512 (1987).
69. NEB. REV. STAT. § 81-1935 (Reissue 1981).

70. Ambroz v. Cornhusker Square, Ltd., 226 Neb. 899, 903, 416 N.W.2d 510, 513 (1987).
71. I& at 903-04, 416 N.W.2d at 514.
72. Id-at 903, 416 N.W.2d at 514.

1993]

EMPLOYMENT AT WILL

Central Indiana Gas Co.73 Therein, the employee was discharged for
filing for workers' compensation benefits for an injury she sustained
on the job. In holding that the employee had stated a cause of action
for wrongful discharge, the Indiana Supreme Court looked to the state
workers' compensation scheme in toto as evidence of "fundamental,
well-defined and well-established [public] policy" as annunciated by
the state legislature. 74 The Indiana court proceeded on a frustration
theory, concluding that
[i]f employers are permitted to penalize employees for filing workmen's compensation claims, a most important public policy will be undermined. The
fear of being discharged
would have a deleterious effect on the exercise of a
75
statutory right.

Nowhere within the state act or its legislative history was there
any suggestion that the state legislature intended employees to have a
private right of action to enforce the act. It is certainly foreseeable
that an employer might terminate an employee for filing a workers's
compensation claim. Accordingly, it is plausible to assume that the
legislature, as indicated by its acquiescence, simply chose not to offer
the remedy of a private action for wrongful discharge.
The specie of argument the Ambroz and Frampton courts relied
upon was that they could not have reached another result without
frustrating what appeared to be clear mandates of public policy. To do
so, they reasoned, would in effect withhold with one hand what the
state legislature had provided with the other.76 This argument is specious, for it rests on the assumption that the legislature would have
intended that a private right of action exist under the respective statutes. Both cases involved statutes that squarely dealt with employment-related matters, where it is presumable that the state legislature
would have provided for a private remedy had it wished. Ironically,
courts such as Ambroz and Framptonthat look to employment-related
positive law, an area where legislatures are the most likely to fully
consider the preferred remedies, appear more willing to imply a private right of action than cases outside of the employment context.
Consequently, it appears as though the Ambroz and Frampton courts
encroached upon the prerogative of the state legislature in determining the appropriate remedies for each particular offense.
This point is driven home in what is perhaps the most clear-cut
example of judicial encroachment, found in the recent case of Hodges
v. S.C. Toof & Co.77 Therein, the employee worked for over nineteen
73.
74.
75.
76.

297 N.E.2d 425 (Ind. 1973).
Id. at 427.
Id.
Schweiger v. Superior Ct. of Alameda County, 476 P.2d 97 (Cal. 1970), noted in
Harless v. First Nat'l Bank, 246 S.E.2d 270 (W. Va. 1978).
77. 833 S.W.2d 896 (Tenn. 1992). To label Hodges as "perhaps the most clear-cut example" is not meant to exclude other "fine" examples of judicial encroachment.
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years for the defendant employer, serving in various capacities including assistant warehouse supervisor. During his tenure, the employee
had received some twenty merit raises and had a clean disciplinary
record.78 The employee alleged that he was terminated for his three
month absence from work while serving jury duty. 79 At the employee's trial, the jury found that the employee was discharged because of his lengthy jury service and awarded employee a substantial
verdict.
On appeal, the Tennessee Supreme Court examined recent modifications in the state's jury duty law. Approximately one year before
the employee's termination in Hodges, the Tennessee legislature had
amended its law dealing with jury duty to provide that:
(1) No employer shall discharge or in any manner discriminate against an employee for serving on jury duty if such employee, prior to taking time off, gives
the required notice .. .to the employer that such employee is required to
serve.

(2)(A) Any employee who is discharged, demoted, or suspended because such
employee has taken time off to serve on jury duty is entitled to reinstatement
and reimbursementfor lost wages and work benefits caused by such acts of
the employer.
(2)(B) Any employer who willfully refuses to rehire, or otherwise restore an
employee or former employee commits a misdemeanor. 8 0

The legislature obviously perceived a problem, or potential problem, and provided express remedies for a wrongfully discharged employee. However, the supreme court held that the statutory scheme
was not the sole and exclusive relief available to the discharged employee, because the amendments did not expressly state that they
were to be the exclusive remedy.8 1 "Had the Legislature intended to

limit relief to the statutory remedies, it could easily have done so."82
Hodges presents a case where the legislature pronounced directly
on a subject, provided specific remedies, and yet the court was still

willing to override the statutory scheme by implying a private right of
action for damages, in addition to the backpay and reinstatement remedies expressly provided for by the legislature. This represents a seri-

ous usurpation of the legislative function by the judiciary.
B.

Tenuous Conflict-Reaching to Find Public Policy
Another category of cases encompasses those in which a state legis-

78.
79.
80.
81.
82.

See, e.g., Murphy v. City of Topeka-Shawnee County Dep't of Labor Servs., 630
P.2d 186 (Kan. Ct. App. 1981)(recognizing public policy exception based on retaliatory discharge despite the fact that the legislature had twice failed to enact legislation expressly creating this cause of action).
833 S.W.2d at 898.
Id.
TENN. CODE ANN. § 22-4-108(f)(Supp. 1993)(emphasis added).
Hodges v. S.C. Toof & Co., 833 S.W.2d 896, 899 (Tenn. 1992).
Id. (footnote omitted).
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lature has addressed a subject in broad and general terms, yet has not
spoken directly on the intended remedies. In such instances, it is
clearly plausible that the state legislature overlooked the issue of
whether or not to provide for a private right of action as a means of
enforcing the statutory scheme. Nevertheless, courts should tread
lightly before creating a new remedy in the form of a public policy
exception to employment at will.
The Oregon Supreme Court in Nees v. Hocks3 held that an employee had stated a cause of action for wrongful discharge, although
no state statute specifically addressed the public policy involved. In
Nees, the employee was allegedly terminated because she served on
jury duty against the wishes of her employer. The court stretched to
find a source of public policy, finding it expressed only indirectly in an
Oregon constitutional provision for trial by jury,8 4 and state statutes
which established exemptions85 and deferments8 6 for jury duty, as
well as a penalty scheme for failure to appear.8 7 The court resolved
the fact that it could not point to a specific mandate of public policy by
balancing the community's interest in having its citizens available to
serve jury duty against the employer's interest in setting his own standards for discharge. The court concluded that "there can be circumstances in which an employer discharges an employee for such a
socially undesirable motive that the employer must respond in damages for any injury done."8 8
Nees presents a situation where the Oregon legislature, which had
spoken on specific jury duty issues such as exemptions, deferments
and penalties for failure to appear, certainly could have addressed the
issue of private rights of action, had it intended such a mode of enforcement to exist. However, unlike the Ambroz-Frampton-Hodges
line of cases,8 9 it is conceivable that the state legislature in Nees simply
did not think to address the issue of private rights of action. However,
by holding that a private cause of action via the public policy exception
existed, the Nees court may have ignored the implicit intent of the
legislature and encroached upon its policy-making prerogative.
If the Oregon legislature had intended to create a private right of
83. 536 P.2d 512 (Or. 1975).
84. The state constitutional provision the court relied upon provided that:
In actions at law, where the value in controversy shall exceed $200, the
right of trial by jury shall be preserved, and no fact tried by a jury shall
be otherwise re-examined in any court of this state, unless the court can
affirmatively say there is no evidence to support the verdict.
85.
86.
87.
88.

OI. CONST. art. VII, § 3.
OR. REV. STAT. § 10.040 (repealed

1979), 10.050 (1975).
Id § 10.055 (1975)(current version at OR. REV. STAT. § 10.055 (1991)).
Id § 10.990 (1975)(current version at OR.REV. STAT. § 10.990 (1991)).
Nees v. Hocks, 536 P.2d 512, 515 (Or. 1975).

89. See supra section IV.A.
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action for wrongful discharge for absence due to jury service, the legislature clearly could have followed the lead of states like Wisconsin
that have provided such remedies. The State of Wisconsin expressly
enacted a statutory provision which prohibits the discharge or discipline of an at will employee for absence from work due to jury
service. 90
Thus, Nees presents an example of where a conflict may have occurred between the legislature and the judiciary in their roles as policy making bodies.
C.

Absence of Conflict

Although today they represent the exception rather than the rule,
a minority of courts have rightly deferred to the elected policy makers
of the state-the state legislature-in situations where a private right
of action has not been expressly provided for by the legislature. For
instance, the Court of Appeals for the State of New York was unable
to find a clear mandate of public policy to justify an abrogation of the
employment at will doctrine via a wrongful discharge action in Mur91
phy v. American Home Products Corp.
The plaintiff in Murphy was terminated after twenty-three years
of employment with the defendant in various capacities. Plaintiff
claimed that he was fired for two reasons: (1) because of his disclosure
to top management of alleged accounting improprieties on the part of
corporate personnel; and (2) his age, which was fifty-nine. 92 He alleged abusive discharge, intentional infliction of emotional distress,
prima facie tort, breach of covenant of good faith and fair dealing and
age discrimination. 93
On appeal the court reinstated plaintiff's age discrimination claim,
but dismissed all other claims against the defendant. Noting that
"such a significant change in our law is best left to the Legislature," 94
the court declined to recognize a public policy exception to employment at will.
The Legislature has infinitely greater resources and procedural means to discern the public will, to examine the variety of pertinent considerations, to
elicit the views of the various segments of the community that would be directly affected and in any event critically interested, and to investigate and
anticipate the impact of imposition of such liability. Standards should doubtless be established applicable to the multifarious types of employment and the
various circumstances of discharge. If the rule of nonliability for termination
of at-will employment is to be tempered, it should be accomplished through a
90. Wis. STAT. ANN. § 756.25(1)(West Supp. 1992). The statute provides reinstatement and backpay as remedies for an aggrieved employee.
91. 448 N.E.2d 86 (N.Y. 1983).
92. Id. at 87.
93. Id at 88.
94. Id-at 89.
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principled statutory scheme, adopted after opportunity for public ventilation,
resolution of the partisan arguments of
rather than in consequence of judicial
95
individual adversarial litigants.

Arguably, through its failure to enact a statutory provision which
protected employees from discharge for reporting improprieties inter-

nally to company management, the New York legislature tacitly chose
not to abrogate the at will rule by providing for a private cause of ac-

tion. Realizing this, the New York court chose to defer to the legislature in the declaration of public policy. Certainly the court could have

hung its hat on general declarations of positive law or general standards or morals to serve as the basis for a public policy in Murphy.
However, it chose not to.
The decision of whether or not to create an exception to the employment at will rule is best left to the elected officials in the state
legislature, due to their accountability and sensitivity to pertinent
96
Unlike legislatures, courts are ill-equipped to serve
political issues.
of public policy in the employment arena; they are
pronouncers
as
confined to the facts of the specific case at hand and often fail to fully
consider the broader policy ramifications inherent in their decisions.
97
Legislatures, through their vast resources and ability to deliberate,

are better able to grasp the broader implications of enacting exceptions to employment at will.
Allowing legislatures, rather than courts, to determine whether to
allow a public policy exception and the appropriate remedies thereun95. Id at 89-90.
96. We would be wise to heed the words of Publius. In The Federalist No. 47, James
Madison quoted Montesquieu to emphasize the importance of separate duties for
the different branches of government: "Were the power of judging joined with
the legislative, the life and liberty of the subject would be exposed to arbitrary
control, for thejudge would then be the lgislator. Were it joined to the executive
power, thejudge might behave with all the violence of an oppressor."THE FEDERALIST OR THE NEw CONSTrrUTON 247 (Ernest Rhys ed. 1929)(emphasis in
original).
97. Making his case for congressional term limits, political commentator George Will
waxed eloquent on the deliberative spirit of our nation's representative
legislature.
Remember, a republic is a society presumed to have a broad diffusion
of thoughtfulness. In a republic, persuasion rather than inspirationreason rather than emotion-is supposed to move the citizenry.... A
deliberative legislature, composed of people exercising judgment, can do
what leaders are supposed to do. It can inspirit people by the dignity of
its deliberations. It can persuade by the gravity of its procedures as well
as the plausibility of its conclusions. This is the noble power possessed
by ordinary people who take up the republican task of deliberating for
the community, in public. Let us call these deliberating people "leaders." Let us call what they do "leadership." But let us not lose sight of
the fact that what they are doing is deliberating. What they are exercising is judgment.
GEORGE F. WILL, RESTORATION: CONGRESS, TERM LimiTS AND THE RECOVERY OF
DELIBERATIVE DEMocRAcY 115 (1992).
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der is more economically efficient. Litigation is costly, time consuming, and results in a great deal of uncertainty among parties
concerning how they should tailor their behavior to avoid legal
liability.98
Moreover, allowing courts to create private rights of action via the
public policy exception to employment at will creates a perverse incentive for legislatures, encouraging legislative abstention in the arena
of employee rights. Instead, courts should invite legislative action and
responsibility by devising incentives for the legislature to step up to
the plate and assume its role as the policy making body of a
jurisdiction.99
Consequently, courts should rightly defer to the legislature in such
matters since the alternative serves only to blur the qualitative differences that exist between the legislature and the judiciary.100
The aforementioned discussion brings us to the thesis of this Article, viz., that the optimum solution is the implementation of a strong
presumption in favor of allowing the legislature, not the judiciary, to
create exceptions to employment at will.
V. SUGGESTED GUIDELINES FOR COURTS
Hard cases present tough choices for courts.10 1 However, to avoid
infringing upon the policy-making authority of the representative legislature, courts should give full consideration to whether the issue of
private enforcement of public policy is best left to the legislature. A
systematic approach to analyzing these issues is needed. This Article
proposes that a strict presumption against implying a private right of
action exist, one that can only be overcome through the establishment
of a clear legislative mandate. The factors presented in the United
98. "The current system, which has evolved through judicially created exceptions, is
expensive, time consuming, and does not serve either party well." Cheryl S. Massingale, At-Will Employment Going, Going..., 24 U. RICH. L. REv. 187, 187
(1990).
99. See ROBERT H. BORK, THE ANTITRUST PARADOx: A POLICY AT WAR WITH ITSELF

83 (1978)("Courts that refuse to make basic policy choices for the legislature
thereby force the legislature to face and decide questions they had previously
been content to leave unanswered. In this way the courts help focus the issues to
be addressed and make the legislative process more responsible.").
Legislatures can always override judicial decisions which they find repugnant.
See Michael E. Solimine & James L. Walker, The Next Word." CongressionalResponse to Supreme Court Statutory Decisions, 65 TEMP. L. REv. 425 (1992)(arguing that legislative response to judicial decisions is healthy for democracy).
100. As Judge Bork observed, legislative bodies "cannot delegate to the judiciary the
basic political decisions of the society." BORK, supra note 99, at 83.
101. Or, as Justice Holmes observed, "Great cases, like hard cases, make bad law."
Northern Sec. Co. v. United States, 193 U.S. 197, 400 (1904)(Holmes, J.,
dissenting).
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States Supreme Court case of Cort v. Ash

0

2 serve as useful guidelines

for courts to use in determining whether a legislature has expressly or
impliedly intended to create a private remedy in the form of a public
policy exception to employment at will.
A.

Is the Employee One of the Class for Whose Especial Benefit the
Policy Exists?
Before recognizing a private right of action in the name of public

policy, courts should address whether or not the discharged employee
is a member of the class of persons the policy was intended to
benefit.103
One of the clearest examples of public policy decisions intended to
benefit a particular class are those cases barring terminations for the
10 4
filing of a workers' compensation claim. For example, in Frampton,
the court held that permitting an employer to terminate an employee
for exercising a right granted by the workers' compensation act would
clearly frustrate the purpose of the act. Since the injured employee
seeking compensation is the focus of any workers' compensation
scheme, an employee who has been terminated for allegedly seeking
such compensation is clearly in the class of persons for whose benefit
the policy was enacted. The workers' compensation specie of problem
presents a clear case for this element, which helps explain why a majority of jurisdictions have recognized the public policy exception for
those employees discharged for asserting compensation rights.105

B.

Is There Any Indication of Implicit or Explicit Legislative Intent to
Either Create or Deny a Private Right of Action?

Courts should inquire into the intent of the legislature in the particular sphere of policy involved before abrogating the employment at
1 06
will rule through the establishment of a public policy exception.
102. 422 U.S. 66, 78 (1975). The fourth factor, whether the cause of action is one traditionally relegated to state law so that it would be inappropriate to infer a federal
law cause of action, is inapplicable for purposes of analyzing public policy exception jurisprudence.
103. Md at 78.
104. See supra notes 73-75 and accompanying text.
105. UNJUST DISMISSAL, supra note 2, at § 6.05[1] n.2.
106. In determining the intention of a particular law, courts saould view legislative
history skeptically. This author is persuaded by Justice Scalia's recent appraisal
of legislative history, where he mocked what he perceived to be the majority's
view that "the oracles of legislative history, far into the dimmy past, must always
be consulted." Conroy v. Aniskoff, 113 S. Ct. 1562, 1567 (1993)(Scalia, J., concurring). Scalia further declared that
[t]he greatest defect of legislative history is its illegitimacy. We are governed by laws, not by the intentions of legislators. As the Court said in
1844: "The law as it is passed is the will of the majority of both houses,
and the only mode in which that will is spoken is in the act itself...."
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As previously discussed,107 the courts in Ambroz, Frampton and
Hodges arguably ignored the implicit intent of the legislature regarding how the relevant provisions were to be enforced. In these cases,
the legislature was silent on whether the respective statutes could be
enforced privately through wrongful discharge actions. However, legislative silence alone should not be indicative of an intent, or lack
thereof, to provide for a private right of action.
For example, it is well settled that the existence of a criminal penalty does not preclude the implication of a private cause of action for
damages.108 However, the existence of only a criminal remedy without anything more serves as evidence that the legislature intended the
criminal remedy to be the sole means for enforcing the provisions of
the statute.
In those instances where it is unclear or ambiguous as to whether a
private right of enforcement can be implied, courts should weigh on
the side of caution, with a "tie" going to the legislature. This would
achieve two objectives. First, it would encourage legislatures to be
more specific in drafting statutes to include the intended remedies and
means of enforcement. 109 This problem is currently being viewed in
the debate surrounding the Civil Rights Act of 1991, where the issue of
retroactivity was left open for the courts to decide. 110 Legislative ambiguity often occurs as a result of legislators attempting to escape the
costs, political or otherwise, of coming down on one side of an issue
and regulating directly.1 '1 Second, encouraging the legislature to expressly establish a statute's intended remedies and means of enforcement would cut numerous costs. For example, transaction costs could
be decreased by eliminating the need to litigate whether or not a pri-

107.
108.
109.

110.

111.

But not the least of the defects of legislative history is its indeterminacy.
If one were to search for an interpretive technique that, on the whole,
was more likely to confuse than to clarify, one could hardly find a more
promising candidate than legislative history.
Id (citation omitted)(emphasis in original).
See supra section IV.A.
Cort v. Ash, 422 U.S. 66, 79 (1975)(citing Wyandotte Transp. Co. v. United States,
389 U.S. 191, 201-02 (1967)).
See Craig N. Oren, Detail and Delegation: A Study in Statutory Specificity, 15
COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 143 (1990)(examining statutory specificity in the realm of
environmental legislation).
Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-166, 105 Stat. 1071 (1991). The Bush
administration took the position that the act should be applied prospectively only.
Civil rights plaintiffs and the Clinton administration, on the other hand, have
argued for retroactive application, citing legislative history that favors their approach. See generally Scott S. Moore, Retroactivity-The Civil Rights Act of 1991,
71 NEB. L. REV. 879 (1992)(discussing whether retroactivity should be read into
the Civil Rights Act of 1991).
Morris P. Fiorina, Legislative Choice of Regulatory Forms: Legal Process or Administrative Process?,39 PUB. CHOICE 33 (1982).
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vate remedy exists.1 12
C. Is It Consistent with the Underlying Purposes of the Legislative
Scheme to Imply Such a Remedy for the Plaintiff?
Before overcoming the presumption against implying a private
right of action, courts should determine whether it would be inconsistent with the general purpose of the statute to permit it to be enforced
privately.
Arguably, the implication of a private remedy under a workers'
compensation statute is inconsistent with the purposes of the act.
Why would a legislature implement a workers' compensation scheme
without providing employees who are retaliatorily discharged with a
private right of action? Clearly, it was foreseeable to the legislature
that an employer could evade its legal obligation to provide compensation to an injured employee by simply terminating the employee. The
legislature may have felt that such an omission was rational, considering the potential damage to reputation, good will 13 and employee moralel14 that employers would undoubtedly experience. The legislature
may have concluded that this loss to employers for terminating such
employees was an adequate disincentive for employers. Moreover, the
legislature may have chosen not to provide a private remedy for fear
of a possible flurry of lawsuits alleging wrongful discharge for filing
for workers' compensation benefits. Hence, it is clearly plausible that
the legislature intended that no private right of action exist.
Therefore, courts must carefully examine the entire legislative
scheme before implying that the legislature intended a public policy
exception to exist.
VI.

CONCLUSION

The time-honored doctrine of employment at will has been eroded
in recent years, as states have created various exceptions to the once
bedrock principle. The most widely recognized of these is the public
policy exception, which rests on the principle that an employer may
not discharge an employee if the purposes behind the discharge frus112. Gregory E. Maggs, Reducing the Costs of Statutory Ambiguity: Alternative Approaches and the Federal Courts Study Committee, 29 HARv. J. ON LEGIS. 123
(1992); Mark A. Fahleson, Congressional Delegation to the Judiciary (December,
1992) (unpublished manuscript, on file with the NebraskaLaw Review) (discussing
costs resulting from legislative drafting of ambiguous statutes).
113. See generally WALTER W. M=uLny II, CRITICAL IssuEs IN BuSINESS CONDUCT:
LEGAL, ETHIcAL, AND SOCIAL CHALLENGES FOR THE 1990S (1990)(extolling the

virtues of goodwill and a positive business reputation).
114. "To fire capriciously... is exceedingly costly to the firm because of its effects on
the morale of the remaining workers." FORBIDDEN GROUNDS, supranote 4, at 155.
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trate clearly mandated public policy. What amounts to "clearly mandated public policy" is the crux of the public policy exception.
In a representative democracy, the legislature is the proper body
for determining the public policy of the jurisdiction, as well as the
remedies and means of the enforcement of its legislation. Courts simply do not possess the fact-finding and deliberative faculties that are
available to the legislature. Consequently, courts should give tremendous deference to the legislature in matters of public policy. A strong
presumption against implying a private right of action via the public
policy exception to employment at will should exist. This presumption could only be overcome through the satisfaction of the factors annunciated in Cort v. Ash. The analytical structure proposed by this
Article will serve to encourage forthright discussion and analysis
before abrogating employment at will through the judicial creation of
a public policy exception.

